Answers to Jenn's Qs

Intro
1. What claim is Gibbard arguing for, in general?That identity can be contingent, and even though Kripke seems to successfully undermine the “account of necessary truth as a priori truth” and goes on to attack of reference based on contingent truths.
2. Translate Gibbard’s (1) [p. 100a] into plain English.
A statue is made up of a piece of clay. It is possible that the piece of clay exists and the statue exists and that they are not the same thing.
3. What is Kripke’s claim that Gibbard wants to focus on? Why? How does he use this in relation to his own claims?
Section I
4. What are “persistence criteria”? Give an example of persistence criteria using some object other than a statue or a lump of clay.
Persistence criteria are the specifications of when/how something of a given identity begins to and ceases to exist. An example would be automobile C—C starts to exist when all of its components are mechanically joined together and ceases to exist when the components are mechanically seperated.
5. What “persistence criteria” does Gibbard give to his piece of clay, c?
P comes into existence when all of its parts are stuck together without being attached to another piece of clay. It ceases to be when the pieces break away or are attached to another lump of clay. Wear is taken into account in this persistence criterion in that P will still be P over time, even if some of it wears away.
6. What “persistence criteria” does Gibbard want to count for his statue, s?
A statue comes into being when a piece of clay is shaped, persists in that shape, and changes in a slow, wear-related fashion.
7. Why does it matter that Gibbard specifies “I claim that as I have defined them, pieces of clay and clay statues are objects. That is to say, they can be designated with proper names, and the logic we ordinarily use will still apply.” [102a top]? Specifically, why does it matter that we can designate them with proper names?
It matters because he wants to talk about how the identity of proper names is contingent, and thus he must show how the identity between two objects, objects that can be named (rigidly designated) might be contingent. This is important because of if a named thing such as “Goliath” is made up of another named thing such as “Lumpl” it starts to suggest that these names are not simply names for the same thing, and that their identities are divisible.
8. How does Gibbard’s case of squeezing Goliath before he dries show that Goliath = Lumpl is a case of contingent identity?
This is a case of identity because there is a time when G and L seem to be the same thing, but that when G ceases to exist L can persist to exist. If they were necessarily identical, when G ceased to exist, L would too, but this does not seem to be the case.
Section II
9. What are concrete things, for Gibbard?
Things that are made up in a simple, systematic way from “fundamental physical entities.”
Section III
10. What in Kripke’s account of proper names makes it follow that Goliath cannot be identical with Lumpl?
Kripke’s position is that proper names are rigid designators of a particular thing. Thus is G and L refer to the same thing in one world, they must refer to the same thing in every possible counterfactual. Gibbard gives his example of where in W1 they would not be, thus they could not be identical in Kripke’s view.
11. What qualification does Gibbard want to give to Kripke’s idea of rigid- and nonrigid-designators? What “rough theory of proper names emerges”? [104b]
We have established that are counterfactual situations where G and L would not be identical. In cross world situations it doesn’t make sense to talk about G or L as referring to the same thing; they are different kinds of things. Gibbard wants to add in this idea of “sortals,” where the kind of thing (statues, pieces of clay) are necessary in talking about identity—an object’s identity must be an identity of a kind of thing.
12. What property of the statue Goliath (or the clay “Lumpl”) allows it to be identified as the same statue (or lump) in other possible worlds?
G in W0 has a common origin with G in W1 (they have the same beginning).
13. In words other than Gibbard’s, what is his theory of reference for cases of things denoted by proper names that branch in other possible worlds? [105a]
Gibbard’s theory of reference depends upon objects such as G having a common origin; G might be left to persist in W0 or squashed in W1, but they have a common origin point which makes the G in W0 and the G in W1 the same statue; the point at which W1’s history changes is a “branching” point.
14. Give a (simple) example of a causal chain of reference for a proper name other than Gibbard’s explanation of Goliath and “Lumpl.”
15. How does his example of “Portia” show that “the persistence criteria invoked help determine what entity bears that name”? [105b bottom]
Section IV
16. Does Gibbard do justice to Kripke’s view about rigid- and nonrigid-designators? What I mean is that he brushes off Kripke’s argument of rigid and nonrigid-designators fairly quickly in saying that his [Kripke’s] argument only shows that designators are rigid with respect to a sortal.
G writes: “To show it [here is he talking about K’s Nixon example] rigid independently of any sortal, one would have to go beyond what Kripke says in the passage I have quoted, and show that Nixon could not have been a different entity from the one he in fact is. For that purpose, the ‘simple intuitive test’ Kripke offers will not help. We speak and think of ‘the same person’ but not of ‘the same entity’” [106b].
I am curious about G’s dismissal of K’s Nixon example, because it seems to me to be obvious that Nixon could not have been a different entity from the one he in fact is. At the very least, it seems like in class discussions there is a lot of disagreement about what makes a person a person; however, whenever Florka asks if he could be (say) a tomato and still be him the answer is usually a resounding “no.” Or, to quote a classmate’s blog: “Consider what makes you, you. It seems that we can’t pick out one specific property, save for your humanity…” (thanks Stan - 9 March post). Therefore, why does G think that K’s example does not show this?

Gibbard thinks that Kripke’s view leads to the strange statement “Nixon could not have been a different entity than the entity he was” and this is dangerous because in our everyday intuitions (Gibbard’s referring to K’s simple intuitive test), we are not thinking about Nixon in the broad sense of an entity, but rather with respect to his humanity. Gibbard is suggesting that this entity question is irrelevant because we aren’t questioning Nixon’s existence when we ask the question ‘Might Nixon have been a different man from the man that he in fact was?’ Gibbard also suggests that this question of an entity’s identity being rigid is complex enough to warrant systems that characterize the identity of an entity and “comparing their implications.” Nixon’s identity is rigid in respect to the human sortal, but it is nonsensical to talk about the rigidness of his identity unless we are identifying him with a specific mode of existence.

Gibbard's "Contingent Identity" Study Questions

1.** What exactly is a “persistence criteria”? Give an example of one (perhaps you could write out the persistence criteria for yourself) and describe its component functions. Judging on what we read in “Identity and Necessity,” do you think Kripke would accept Gibbard’s incorporation of the persistence criteria in identification?

2. Does it make sense to name the piece of clay Lumpl when it is also the statue “Goliath”? Gibbard suggests that it might seem strange to when we aren’t talking with our metaphysicians’ glasses on, but do you think it is possible that when something like a piece of clay becomes a statue, that it stops being a piece of clay?

3.* Gibbard’s goal is to devise a system of for concrete things; a “well-confirmed fundamental physics” (103 a). Could his system or parts of his system be useful for non-concrete things as well? One example might be if an abstraction such as an idea could have a persistence criterion (one that may or may not involve point instants or changing sets of particles.)

4.* What is Gibbard’s point in suggesting that it makes no sense to try and to designate the identity of the statue that is “squeezed out of existence” (104 a)? Why doesn’t it make sense to say that it is either a piece of clay or a statue?

5. What is the exact difference between referring to something and referring to something as something? Does Gibbard believe we ever refer to something without referring to it as something?

6. Is it possible for something to be x rigid and y rigid, with x and y both sharing the same persistence criteria (point instants and changing sets of particles), and for x ≠ y? Give an example in either case.

7*. In Gibbard’s theory of reference, what is a “branching world” (105 a)? How does a branching world possess a reference link to the real world?

8*. What is the relationship between persistence criteria and fixing references? What is the origin of a tradition that passes on a name? How does a persistence criterion help determine the identity of an entity?

9. What is Gibbard’s argument for his claim that situations can be fully stipulated even if the identity questions about an object remain unsettled?

10. What distinguishes Gibbard’s theory of rigid and non rigid designators (considering the application of sortals) and Kripke’s theory?

11. Explain how time functions in Gibbard’s account of how “Goliath” and Lumpl are contingently identical i.e. how does a consideration of each thing’s history influence the view that they are not necessarily identical?

Focus paper on the epistemology and metaphysics of F

The difference between something being an F and how we know it is an F rests in the difference between something possessing a certain property and our ability to know about a property. Our ability to know about a property depends on two avenues of inquiry: through empirical evidence and through analytical reasoning. Suppose our F is actually the letter “f.” We might know the letter is “f” because the symbol is linked to a sound. We also know where “f” falls in the alphabet (this is included in the definition of f-ness, along with its sound), so that we know something is f given its sound (except in cases like “philosophy”) and by its position in the alphabet. We understand some rudimentary rules of English, and then all questions about the identity of “f” become fairly obvious. For example, given this question: “what is the letter between “e” and “g”?” the answer is obvious because part of the definition of “f” is that it falls between these two letters. This is a case of analytically based epistemology; another case would be knowing that a letter is “f” by getting this description: “the sixth letter of the alphabet.” Gaining analytical knowledge of “f” inherently involves understanding the alphabet system. I am uncertain as to whether it actually is possible to gain a priori knowledge of something like an alphabet system. It seems like this system is a conceptual framework of sorts, but it also seems that the only way one can come to any kind of knowledge about the alphabet would be through experiencing it. Is being told about the alphabet or seeing it written out enough to be considered experiencing it? It doesn’t seem as though we can experience it in any other way, or that we could come to any understanding of it aside from what has already been mentioned.

Let us return to the example of knowing “f” by its sound. Before we had cases of analytic understanding of how a letter is “f”; I think that coming to an understanding about “f” through an experience (a posteriori) with its particular sound is gaining empirical knowledge about “f.” It seems that this happens for us as children; we hear the sound and then later we are taught that the sound corresponds with a certain symbol. We are gaining empirical knowledge about a language, something artificially created by humans. A case would be as a child, I don’t know how to say a certain word starting with “f”. I go to my mother and ask her to say it for me. I hear the sound and then understand through my experience of having my mother read it aloud that the letter-sound corresponds to the symbol “f”. This is a case of empirically based epistemology. After empirical knowledge is gained about the alphabet, then it seems that analytical rules can be understood.

Something is an F when it possesses some essential property; it’s F-ness. I take this to go beyond the meaning that something is an F when it is necessarily identical with itself. In other words, something could not be an F unless it has property x in every counterfactual. For example, “f” would not be “f” unless it was a letter. If we try to imagine a counterfactual where “f” is a number (I don’t mean a variable), then I think we should be inclined to say that the thing we are talking about is no longer “f”. It seems that we could imagine a number system that replaces every symbol we take as a letter for a number value, and in this sense “f” could be a number. This would be placing “f” in a new system. But I am still inclined to believe that a symbol that looks identical to “f” outside of our current conceptual framework of language would not actually be “f.” Something is an F because of certain essential properties: for “f” some of them would be a. being a letter, b. corresponding to a certain sound, c. being a certain kind of letter (a consonant), etc.

Alston Study Questions:

Yoder's Answers

4a-1: According to White, the translations show that one need not assert the existence of abstract entities such as ‘age’ or ‘possibility’ in an utterance to communicate the same information in a less ambiguous manner.

4a-2: He means translations that supposedly reduce the existential status of things that Carnap calls “abstract entities” out of assertions, and communicate in a clearer fashion. In other words, the existential quantification of an abstract entity is said to be eliminated in translation to a supposedly clearer sentence.

4a-3: Because they (existential reduction translations) are simply changing the form of sentences, not their meanings; “it is a question of what he says, not how he says it. Hence he cannot repudiate his admission by simply changing his words” (50).

4a-4*: Yes, their meanings are equivalent, and they do assert the existence of possibilities. Alston writes that you assert the existence of possibilities whenever you make a statement that includes “it is possible that…” or something that asserts the same meaning (In Alston’s view) such as “ the statement that x will y is not certainly false” (47).

4a-5**: No, it is not possible that one could utter x and carry an implication of being about ultimate reality while the other cannot. Consider the following statement; “there is a possibility that we will go fishing”. The everyday speaker’s utterance of this phrase means something like “fishing might be one of the things we do today”. The philosopher might be asserting “there are things called possibilities in the universe and one of the properties of possibilities is that you can attach actions and things to them in order to suggest what might exist, or come to pass (or has existed, or has come and passed; or exists, or is happening as we speak)”. It seems that the fisherman is asserting the ultimate reality of fishing in a similar fashion as the philosopher is asserting the ultimate reality of possibilities. If fishing is something that is a possible course of action, then the implication is that fishing is a reality, a part of “the furniture of the universe”. I am not sure of the status of existence when it comes to ‘things’ like actions or events. Fishing clearly calls into both categories. Actions and events are not tangible in the same way that a rock is, or any object that can be empirically accounted for. I am not sure if events or actions can be empiricized. It seems that they could be analytically accounted for in the same way that numbers can be analytically accounted for. Events and actions seem fundamentally different than other kinds of abstract entities because they have components in the same way as concrete objects.

Back to the point; it is not the same utterance can contain a claim about ultimate reality when uttered by two different speakers because each is asserting the ultimate reality of some thing, even if it is not the same thing. It seems that it is impossible for anyone to issue a statement without asserting some ultimate reality, unless they are incorrect in their statement or being facetious.

4a-14: “The seductive grammatical likeness of 1”. Basically, this sentence’s problem is that is confusing. One shouldn’t talk about possibilities in the same way one should talk about concrete objects like chairs. He even admits this designation is dangerous, but he still makes it.

4a-16: The problem of translation has less to do with the positing of existence of abstract entities as much as the problem of clarity. Ex-redux translations of a sentence can be just as confusing as the original with the existential quantifier of an ab-ent. There is no ontological taint on 1; it is a mistake to assume so when chairs and possibilities don’t exist in the same way. But when possibility’s existence is asserted in the same way as chair’s existence is asserted, it leads to confusion.

Answers to Carnap's DQs; provided by AJ Davis and Klaus Yoder

3b-1.We take an abstract entity to be what Carnap (and others) calls a universal. This means something that cannot be immediately detected through sense data. Examples of abstract entities would be numbers, relations, and propositions. Carnap writes that they are "properties as designated by predicates and propositions as designated by sentences" (13b).

3b-2. Because empiricists generally try to avoid the usage of abstract entities in their formulations as much as possible. This is due to the fact that abstract entities do not seem to designate any concrete material thing. Nominalists maintain that abstract entities are a product of the human mind and do not really exist in the universe.

3b-3. He means a linguistic framework is the way of describing ("speaking" in his words) a new entity by means of a new set of language rules. You set one up by describing the new entity's existence by introducing a general term for the new entity and then variables where the new entity could be a substitutable value for the variable. An example could be introducing the entity happiness into the system of emotion. Frameworks make systems and languages possible.

3b-4. An internal question of existence would be a question of existence based on empirical data or logical conclusions. To answer an internal question of existence, one must "succeed in incorporating it into the system of things" (14a), on the empirical or logical level. An example would be "is Hercules a human?"

3b-5. An external question of existence is a question concerning the existence of the entire linguistic framework, such as "is there a theoretical argument for the number system?" Carnap would not think that there is a way for someone who accepts the framework F to externally question the existence of g because outside of framework F, there is no way to recognize properties of g. There are no logical or empirical rules to address g's existence with external questions.

3b-6. External questions cannot be solved in a theoretical sense. They can be meaningful in asking questions about the efficiency of a linguistic framework.

3b-7.** It does not seem possible to have a metalanguage about languages/frameworks that turns the external question about existents in a particular framework into real theoretical questions about the reality of those things because all languages, including metalanguages require frameworks that are not theoretically justifiable. These frameworks can only be evaluated on a practical, internal scale. So theoretical questions are only meaningful when internally addressed.

3b-13. A pseudo-question is a question in the form of a theoretical question which is non-theoretical. This suggests that questions of this sort attempt to address the theoretical aspects of systems, but are unable to because of the lack of a coherent framework.

3b-19. The "Fido"-Fido principle is Ryle's critique of the false assumption that just because something is named that it necessarily designates some particular.

Reflections on what Language can tell us about Existence

At first consideration, it seems that language reports things about the world around us, allowing human beings to signify aspects of the world. But it also seems that language does more than just report about things and conditions of the world; I am inclined to say that language is fundamental in structuring our observations and consequently, our interactions with the world. What I mean by this is our understanding of the world is perhaps completely dependant upon how we report and structure perceptions with language. Take for example this sentence: "Maggie is the dog in my house." 'Maggie' is a name that is given meaning by the word “is” ("to be"). So 'the dog in my house' is a predicate of Maggie. This seems clear enough. I walk into my house, see this black furry thing, which I have labeled 'dog' by the conventions of the English language. Further more, this individual is a particular dog, and my name for this particular dog is Maggie. "Maggie", "dog", and "house" all seem to be terms that refer to objects in the world. But terms like "the" and "my" do not seem to be words that directly correspond or refer to objects in the world. What do they have to do with the way language tells us things about existence?

It seems that these two terms are examples of relational terms. This means they are terms that relate the speaker to any kind of object or objects in the world. We’ll start with the harder of the two to explain: “the.” “the” indicates a singular object, specifically a particular out of a class of things. So for example “the dog at my feet.” It seems that someone needs to be designating the singularity of such a term that is preceded by “the” and in this sense “the” is a language construct that is used by speakers a tool to designate the individuality of things that are inconvenient to name. By this same token, “my” is also a word-tool that allows for the speaker to identify a particular out of some multitude of items (my apple), only “my” also possesses the characteristic of designating possession of an object in the world. But I think it is important to understand that some pieces of language report on the world, and some other pieces are used to explain our relation to the world. This leads to the idea of what words actually inform us about existence? Nouns report on the existence of the objects they refer to (in cases like unicorns, I’d say these nouns report on the existing hypothetical ideas about the non-existing object/class of object). Articles, adjectives, and pronouns do not actually refer to objects existing in the world. They do, however, report on the speaker or subject’s relationship with existing objects.

Study Questions 2

5. A simple symbol is a symbol that "designates a certain particular" with the use of one symbol. Names are simple symbols because they refer to one object, such as the Statue of Liberty. They simply refer to an individal object. A complex symbol is a symbol made up of constituent simple symbols which all have fixed meanings. A simple symbol's meaning seems less fixed unless one has had experience with the object that is being referenced.

9. The argument for the difference between a name and a description is that when you try to interchange a name with a description (even a description that seems to be identical to the name) in a proposition, it fundamentally changes the proposition. The truth value possibly changes.

10*. "Scott" is a description when it refers to "the author of Waverly." In this case, Scott is a description with it foundation on the term "author" which in no way refers to the actual individual person. "Author" is a general term with a fixed meaning available to all English speakers which is not specific to Sir Walter.
"Scott" as a name only refers to the who person who is called "Scott," which is not some general meaning available to all. 'Is' is used as a predicate in the case of description; 'Is' is used for identity in the case of a name--for example, Sir Walter is Scott.

14. Denying 'the present king of france is bald' comes in 2 flavors: it is not the case that there is an individual who fits into the description "present king of france." OR it is not the case that there is an individual who fits the decription "bald king of france."
Scott names someone, so he cannot be denied his humanity on the basis that Scott does not exist. The only way his humanity can be denied is if he is not a human.