Gibbard's "Contingent Identity" Study Questions
1.** What exactly is a “persistence criteria”? Give an example of one (perhaps you could write out the persistence criteria for yourself) and describe its component functions. Judging on what we read in “Identity and Necessity,” do you think Kripke would accept Gibbard’s incorporation of the persistence criteria in identification?
2. Does it make sense to name the piece of clay Lumpl when it is also the statue “Goliath”? Gibbard suggests that it might seem strange to when we aren’t talking with our metaphysicians’ glasses on, but do you think it is possible that when something like a piece of clay becomes a statue, that it stops being a piece of clay?
3.* Gibbard’s goal is to devise a system of for concrete things; a “well-confirmed fundamental physics” (103 a). Could his system or parts of his system be useful for non-concrete things as well? One example might be if an abstraction such as an idea could have a persistence criterion (one that may or may not involve point instants or changing sets of particles.)
4.* What is Gibbard’s point in suggesting that it makes no sense to try and to designate the identity of the statue that is “squeezed out of existence” (104 a)? Why doesn’t it make sense to say that it is either a piece of clay or a statue?
5. What is the exact difference between referring to something and referring to something as something? Does Gibbard believe we ever refer to something without referring to it as something?
6. Is it possible for something to be x rigid and y rigid, with x and y both sharing the same persistence criteria (point instants and changing sets of particles), and for x ≠ y? Give an example in either case.
7*. In Gibbard’s theory of reference, what is a “branching world” (105 a)? How does a branching world possess a reference link to the real world?
8*. What is the relationship between persistence criteria and fixing references? What is the origin of a tradition that passes on a name? How does a persistence criterion help determine the identity of an entity?
9. What is Gibbard’s argument for his claim that situations can be fully stipulated even if the identity questions about an object remain unsettled?
10. What distinguishes Gibbard’s theory of rigid and non rigid designators (considering the application of sortals) and Kripke’s theory?
11. Explain how time functions in Gibbard’s account of how “Goliath” and Lumpl are contingently identical i.e. how does a consideration of each thing’s history influence the view that they are not necessarily identical?
2. Does it make sense to name the piece of clay Lumpl when it is also the statue “Goliath”? Gibbard suggests that it might seem strange to when we aren’t talking with our metaphysicians’ glasses on, but do you think it is possible that when something like a piece of clay becomes a statue, that it stops being a piece of clay?
3.* Gibbard’s goal is to devise a system of for concrete things; a “well-confirmed fundamental physics” (103 a). Could his system or parts of his system be useful for non-concrete things as well? One example might be if an abstraction such as an idea could have a persistence criterion (one that may or may not involve point instants or changing sets of particles.)
4.* What is Gibbard’s point in suggesting that it makes no sense to try and to designate the identity of the statue that is “squeezed out of existence” (104 a)? Why doesn’t it make sense to say that it is either a piece of clay or a statue?
5. What is the exact difference between referring to something and referring to something as something? Does Gibbard believe we ever refer to something without referring to it as something?
6. Is it possible for something to be x rigid and y rigid, with x and y both sharing the same persistence criteria (point instants and changing sets of particles), and for x ≠ y? Give an example in either case.
7*. In Gibbard’s theory of reference, what is a “branching world” (105 a)? How does a branching world possess a reference link to the real world?
8*. What is the relationship between persistence criteria and fixing references? What is the origin of a tradition that passes on a name? How does a persistence criterion help determine the identity of an entity?
9. What is Gibbard’s argument for his claim that situations can be fully stipulated even if the identity questions about an object remain unsettled?
10. What distinguishes Gibbard’s theory of rigid and non rigid designators (considering the application of sortals) and Kripke’s theory?
11. Explain how time functions in Gibbard’s account of how “Goliath” and Lumpl are contingently identical i.e. how does a consideration of each thing’s history influence the view that they are not necessarily identical?
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