Answers to Carnap's DQs; provided by AJ Davis and Klaus Yoder
3b-1.We take an abstract entity to be what Carnap (and others) calls a universal. This means something that cannot be immediately detected through sense data. Examples of abstract entities would be numbers, relations, and propositions. Carnap writes that they are "properties as designated by predicates and propositions as designated by sentences" (13b).
3b-2. Because empiricists generally try to avoid the usage of abstract entities in their formulations as much as possible. This is due to the fact that abstract entities do not seem to designate any concrete material thing. Nominalists maintain that abstract entities are a product of the human mind and do not really exist in the universe.
3b-3. He means a linguistic framework is the way of describing ("speaking" in his words) a new entity by means of a new set of language rules. You set one up by describing the new entity's existence by introducing a general term for the new entity and then variables where the new entity could be a substitutable value for the variable. An example could be introducing the entity happiness into the system of emotion. Frameworks make systems and languages possible.
3b-4. An internal question of existence would be a question of existence based on empirical data or logical conclusions. To answer an internal question of existence, one must "succeed in incorporating it into the system of things" (14a), on the empirical or logical level. An example would be "is Hercules a human?"
3b-5. An external question of existence is a question concerning the existence of the entire linguistic framework, such as "is there a theoretical argument for the number system?" Carnap would not think that there is a way for someone who accepts the framework F to externally question the existence of g because outside of framework F, there is no way to recognize properties of g. There are no logical or empirical rules to address g's existence with external questions.
3b-6. External questions cannot be solved in a theoretical sense. They can be meaningful in asking questions about the efficiency of a linguistic framework.
3b-7.** It does not seem possible to have a metalanguage about languages/frameworks that turns the external question about existents in a particular framework into real theoretical questions about the reality of those things because all languages, including metalanguages require frameworks that are not theoretically justifiable. These frameworks can only be evaluated on a practical, internal scale. So theoretical questions are only meaningful when internally addressed.
3b-13. A pseudo-question is a question in the form of a theoretical question which is non-theoretical. This suggests that questions of this sort attempt to address the theoretical aspects of systems, but are unable to because of the lack of a coherent framework.
3b-19. The "Fido"-Fido principle is Ryle's critique of the false assumption that just because something is named that it necessarily designates some particular.
3b-2. Because empiricists generally try to avoid the usage of abstract entities in their formulations as much as possible. This is due to the fact that abstract entities do not seem to designate any concrete material thing. Nominalists maintain that abstract entities are a product of the human mind and do not really exist in the universe.
3b-3. He means a linguistic framework is the way of describing ("speaking" in his words) a new entity by means of a new set of language rules. You set one up by describing the new entity's existence by introducing a general term for the new entity and then variables where the new entity could be a substitutable value for the variable. An example could be introducing the entity happiness into the system of emotion. Frameworks make systems and languages possible.
3b-4. An internal question of existence would be a question of existence based on empirical data or logical conclusions. To answer an internal question of existence, one must "succeed in incorporating it into the system of things" (14a), on the empirical or logical level. An example would be "is Hercules a human?"
3b-5. An external question of existence is a question concerning the existence of the entire linguistic framework, such as "is there a theoretical argument for the number system?" Carnap would not think that there is a way for someone who accepts the framework F to externally question the existence of g because outside of framework F, there is no way to recognize properties of g. There are no logical or empirical rules to address g's existence with external questions.
3b-6. External questions cannot be solved in a theoretical sense. They can be meaningful in asking questions about the efficiency of a linguistic framework.
3b-7.** It does not seem possible to have a metalanguage about languages/frameworks that turns the external question about existents in a particular framework into real theoretical questions about the reality of those things because all languages, including metalanguages require frameworks that are not theoretically justifiable. These frameworks can only be evaluated on a practical, internal scale. So theoretical questions are only meaningful when internally addressed.
3b-13. A pseudo-question is a question in the form of a theoretical question which is non-theoretical. This suggests that questions of this sort attempt to address the theoretical aspects of systems, but are unable to because of the lack of a coherent framework.
3b-19. The "Fido"-Fido principle is Ryle's critique of the false assumption that just because something is named that it necessarily designates some particular.
posted by Klaus at
7:58 AM
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